Abstract. We consider a two-player zero-sum-game in a bounded open domain Ω described as follows: at a point x ∈ Ω, Players I and II play an ε-step tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β (α + β = 1), a random point in the ball of radius ε centered at x is chosen. Once the game position reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a fixed payoff function F .
Introduction
We study a two-player zero-sum-game described as follows: starting from a point x 0 ∈ Ω, Players I and II play the tug-of-war game with probability α, and with probability β, a random point in B ε (x 0 ) is chosen. The players continue starting from the new point until the game position reaches a strip near the boundary, and then Player II pays Player I the amount given by a payoff function. This game was studied in a slightly different form by Peres and Sheffield in [9] , and the tug-of-war game by Peres, Schramm, Sheffield, and Wilson in [8] .
We aim to provide a self-contained proof of the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) written in a language more familiar to analysts. For a proof in the context of the general theory of stochastic games see the book Maitra-Sudderth [4] in discrete state spaces, and the paper [3] for general state spaces.
To be more precise, we show that the value functions for the tug-of-war game with noise satisfy the following 1 u(y) dy (1.1) for x ∈ Ω. This property provides a useful tool in many applications.
Intuitively, the expected payoff at the point can be calculated by summing up all the three cases: Player I moves, Player II moves, or a random point is chosen, with their corresponding probabilities. Player I, who tries to maximize the payoff, will choose a point maximizing the expected payoff, and Player II a point minimizing the expected payoff.
Functions satisfying the Dynamic Programming Principle with α = 1 and β = 0, that is,
u(y) ,
are called harmonious functions, see Le Gruyer [1] and Le Gruyer-Archer [2] . Furthermore, Oberman used a similar approach to obtain numerical approximations in [7] . As ε goes to zero, harmonious functions approximate solutions to the infinity Laplacian. To be more precise, Le Gruyer proved in [1] , see also [8] , that a uniform limit of a sequence of harmonious functions when ε → 0 is a solution to ∆ ∞ u = 0, where
is the 1−homogeneous infinity Laplacian.
In the general case in [6] , see also [5] , the authors studied functions that satisfy (1.1) and proved that they approximate solutions to the p-Laplacian
A key tool for the analysis was the Dynamic Programming Principle (1.1) applied to our game.
Tug-of-War games with noise
Let Ω ⊂ R n be a bounded open set and ε > 0. We denote the compact boundary strip of width ε by Further, we denote by B ε (x) the open Euclidean ball and with B ε (x) its closure B ε (x) = {y ∈ R n : |y − x| ≤ ε}. Players I and II play as follows. At an initial time, they place a token at a point x 0 ∈ Ω and toss a biased coin with probabilities α and β, α + β = 1. If they get heads (probability α), they toss a fair coin and the winner of the toss moves the game position to any x 1 ∈ B ε (x 0 ) of his choice. On the other hand, if they get tails (probability β), the game state moves according to the uniform probability density to a random point x 1 ∈ B ε (x 0 ). Then they continue playing from x 1 .
This procedure yields a sequence of game states x 0 , x 1 , . . .. Once the game position reaches the boundary strip Γ ε , the game ends and Player II pays Player I the amount given by a payoff function F : Γ ε → R, which is assumed to be Borel measurable. Player I earns F (x k ) while Player II earns −F (x k ).
A strategy S I for Player I is a collection of measurable mappings
Player I wins the toss given a partial history (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k ). Similarly Player II plays according to a strategy S II . The next game position x k+1 ∈ B ε (x k ), given a partial history (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k ), is distributed according to the probability
. From now on, we shall omit k and simply denote the strategies by S I and S II .
Let us fix strategies S I , S II . Let Ω ε = Ω ∪ Γ ε ⊂ R n be equipped with the natural topology, and the σ-algebra B of the Borel sets. The space of all game sequences
is a product space endowed with the product topology. Let {F k } ∞ k=0 denote the filtration of σ-algebras, F 0 ⊂ F 1 ⊂ . . . defined as follows: F k is the product σ-algebra generated by cylinder sets of the form
we define the coordinate processes
is the smallest σ-algebra so that all X k are F ∞ -measurable. To denote the time when the game state reaches the boundary, we define a random variable
which is a stopping time relative to the filtration {F k } ∞ k=0 . A starting point x 0 and the strategies S I and S II determine a unique probability measure P x 0 S I ,S II on H ∞ relative to the σ-algebra F ∞ . This measure is built by Kolmogorov's extension theorem, see (3.2) below and Theorem 3.5. in Varadhan [10] , to the family of transition probabilities
The expected payoff is then
Note that, due to the fact that β > 0, the game ends almost surely
for any choice of strategies because the game sequences contain arbitrary long sequences of random steps with probability 1. The value of the game for Player I is given by
while the value of the game for Player II is given by
The values u I (x 0 ) and u II (x 0 ) are in a sense the best expected outcomes each player can almost guarantee when the game starts at x 0 . For the measurability of the value functions we refer to [3] .
A proof of the DPP
In this section, we prove that the values u I and u II satisfy the Dynamic Programming Principle. To this end, we define measures inductively on finite products as
This is the family of measures used to construct the measure P x 0 S I ,S II by applying Kolmogorov's theorem. In particular,
and thus
Conditioning with respect to the possible first steps plays a key role in the proof. Following the notation in [3] , we denote by S I [x 1 ] a conditional strategy obtained by conditioning with respect to the first step. As the name suggests, this conditional strategy is defined on the partial histories of the form (x 0 , x 1 , . . .). Next we write the expectation as an integral of the conditional expectations.
Lemma 3.1. There exists a family of measures
The inner integral in the lemma above is a representative of a conditional expectation given the first points x 0 , X 1 = X 1 (ω) = ω 1 .
Proof of Lemma 3.1. First, observe that
where the equalityμ 1,(x 0 ,ω 1 )
defines a new family of measures. Now we assume, arguing by induction, that there existsμ
Next we show that this implies that there existsμ k,(x 0 ,ω 1 )
where the family of measuresμ k,(x 0 ,ω 1 )
Thus, we have inductively defined measuresμ k,(x 0 ,ω 1 )
. By Kolmogorov's extension theorem, there exists a family of probability measures P
The claim follows from this equation.
Every strategy S I can be decomposed into the first step S I (x 0 ) and the rest S rest I , where S rest I contains exactly all the conditional strategies S I [x 1 ], x 1 ∈ B ε (x 0 ). The next lemma plays a key role in the proof of the DPP.
Lemma 3.2. It holds that
Briefly, this is due to the fact that Player I can optimize her conditional strategy S I [x] without affecting the conditional strategy S I [y] if y = x. Thus we see that Player II gets no advantage by choosing his first step on the left hand side of (3.8).
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The direction "≤" is clear and we can concentrate on showing the reverse inequality. For any η > 0, ω 1 ∈ B ε (x 0 ), and S I , Player II can choose a strategy S * II [ω 1 ] such that Ωε×...
Since the conditional strategy S II [x] can be manipulated without affecting S II [y] as long as x = y, this argument can be repeated for each ω 1 , and thus the procedure defines a strategy S * II , cf. [3] , so that the above inequality holds for each ω 1 ∈ B ε (x 0 ) with this strategy. By using a trivial estimate and integrating the above inequality, we deduce
for any π S I ,S II . We repeat the same argument for Player I with η > 0, and construct S * I . Thus recalling the previous inequality and (3.3), we deduce sup
Next we take inf S II (x 0 ) on both sides, use a trivial estimate, and obtain
Since η, η > 0 are arbitrary, this proves (3.8).
Next we show that taking sup and inf over conditional strategies with respect to a fixed second point ω 1 gives the value u I at that point.
Proof. We denote by S
we have a starting point ω 1 . Given such strategies S (3.10) and analogously for S ω 1 II . Definition (3.10) applied in the calculation
shows that the transition probabilities are the same. This fact, (3.5), and (3.7) implỹ µ 2,(x 0 ,ω 1 )
Assume then that
Thus by induction
Similarly, if we are given two conditional strategies
II , and repeat the above reasoning. By taking the infimum and the supremum, we obtain sup
which proves the claim. Now, we are ready to prove our main result. 
Further, the value function for Player II satisfies the same equation.
Proof. The idea in the proof is to decompose the strategies with respect to the first step and the rest. Following the notation of Lemma 3.2, we have
According to Lemma 3.2
This together with (3.3) implies
where we denoted
The justification for interchanging sup inf with the first integral is similar to that in (3.8) , that is, the conditional strategy S I [x] can be manipulated without affecting S I [y] as long as x = y. By (3.11), Lemma 3.3, and (2.1), we obtain
In the last equality we used the fact that the infimum only affects the second term, the supremum only the first term, and the third term is independent of the strategies. This completes the proof.
Let the payoff function F be bounded. Given the value functions
there are natural strategies for each player. These strategies turn out to be Markovian and quasioptimal. Fix η > 0 and define strategieš
as follows: These strategies depend on η and they define a measure P where τ ∧ k = min(τ, k), and we used Fatou's lemma as well as the optional stopping theorem for u I (x k ) + η2 −k . This shows that u I (x 0 ) − v η (x 0 ) ≥ −η. The inequality u I (x 0 ) − v η (x 0 ) ≤ η follows by a symmetric argument usingŠ I .
